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The party is required to have obtained a court order under CPLR
3124 in order to utilize the penalties of CPLR 3126. However,
it has recently been held, in Fleming v. Fleming,6" that notice
of disclosure is sufficient to enforce the penalties of CPLR 3126.
There the court said:
To invite disregard of a notice for an examination or a
inspection by effectively removing any real sanctions
intents and purposes 'import into the disclosure practice
the abuses against which our courts inveighed under bills
practice under the CPA.' 65

discovery and
would, to all
of the CPLR
of particulars

Although Fleming upheld the notice of disclosure, it refused
to grant attorney fees since there was no express statutory provision for this sanction, and the proposals for the attorney fee
provision had been rejected by the Advisory Committee in 1961
and again in 1966.66
The question thus arises as to whether a court may require the
payment of attorney fees without an express statutory mandate.
Under CPLR 3126, the court is empowered to "make such orders
with regard to the failure or refusal as are just. . . ." This section
lists several of the sanctions which the court may enforce. The
language of the section seems to indicate that the enumerated
sanctions are not the exclusive remedies which a court may impose.
Since the courts are hesitant to impose the harsh penalties stated
in CPLR 3126, the wrongdoer actually receives a benefit. Instead
of being punished, he will be warned that if he does not submit
to an EBT, a 3126 motion will be granted against him. Thus,
by not actually imposing a penalty, CPLR 3126 apparently loses
its effect. The middle ground would seem to be the imposition
of costs and counsel fees, thus retaining the effectiveness of CPLR
3126 while mitigating the harshness of the penalties imposed.
ARTICLE 32 CPLR 3211(a) (4):

ACcELERATED JUDGMENT

Stay granted upon condition.

In Gallo v. Mayer 6 7 plaintiff, after commencing a state court
action for breach of contract and common-law fraud, instituted a
federal court action, based on the same facts, for a violation of the
Securities Exchange Act. The federal action included an additional
6450 Misc. 2d 323, 270 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Sup. Ct Queens County 1966).
65 Id. at 325, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 355. See also 1966 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 90,
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66 Id. at 326, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
Misc. 2d 385, 270 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
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defendant. Defendants in the state court action moved for a stay
until disposition of the federal action. This motion was denied.
The court noted that although neither the state nor the federal
court had jurisdiction over all three causes of action, many of the
issues were common to both proceedings, so that, on the basis of collateral estoppel, an adjudication of the state court action would foreclose relitigation of these common issues in the federal action. In addition, the defendants failed to show that conveniences would be
served by giving the federal action precedence, or that added
expenses would be involved in permitting the state action to
proceed to trial. Therefore, the court denied the motion for a
stay, on condition that, in the federal action, the plaintiff stipulate
that any beneficial collateral estoppel effect which the state court
judgment would have on the state court defendants would also be
6
fully accorded to the additional defendant in the federal action.
The decision in Gallo is illustrative of the broad discretionary
powers exercised by courts deciding motions to stay under CPLR
3211(a) (4). 69 This section provides that, where another related
action is pending between the same parties, the court, in lieu of a
dismissal, may issue "such order as justice requires." This broad
authorization for judicial discretion is clearly justifiable, for in
instances of parallel litigation, the requirements and circumstances
of any particular case will determine what order the court should
issue.70
CPLR 3211(a) (5): Statute of limitations in annulment action.
Statutes of limitations are statutes of repose 71 which compel
the exercise of a right of action within a designated time. When
affirmatively pleaded, these statutes bar stale claims by denying a
do not extinguish the cause of action, right or
remedy; they
72
obligation.

Distinguishable from statutes of limitations are statutes which
create a right of action and annex conditions to that right. Such
an enactment makes the time limitation an essential part of the
statute out of which the right in question arises, so that a lapse
of the statutory period operates to extinguish the right altogether.
Such time qualifications annexed to a statutory cause of action,
therefore, become jurisdictional elements that cannot be waived
73
merely because they were not specially pleaded by the parties.
681d. at 388, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 299-300.
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(1965).
70 Iid.
71 Shoemaker v. Benedict, 11 N.Y. 176 (1854).
72 Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N.Y. 261, 91 N.E. 582 (1910).
73 United States v. Wardwell, 172 U.S. 48 (1898).
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